



# Biodiversity, globalisation and communicable diseases in Europe

*Jonathan E. Suk, ECDC*

# Credits



## Partner agencies

- EFSA
- EMA
- WHO
- European Commission

## AMR

- Dominique Monnet

## Food-borne diseases

- Johanna Takkinen

## Vector-borne diseases

- Herve Zeller

## Climate change

- Jan Semenza





- EU agency established 2005 – Stockholm
- Covering EU 28 & 3 EEA countries
- Staff: 300 approx.
- Most EU nationalities represented





# Our mission

*‘ECDC’s mission is to identify, assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human health posed by **infectious diseases**’. (ECDC founding regulation 851/2004)*

## Core functions:


- Disease surveillance
- Epidemic intelligence
- Risk assessment
- Health communication
- Scientific advice and guidance
- Response support
- Preparedness and capacity strengthening
- Training



- Antimicrobial resistance and healthcare-associated infections
- Emerging and vector-borne diseases
- Food- and waterborne diseases and zoonoses
- Influenza
- Microbiology
- Tuberculosis
- HIV, sexually transmitted infections and viral hepatitis
- Vaccine-preventable diseases





# Preface: Major Recent Emerging and Reemerging Infectious-Disease Outbreaks



# Increasing trend in infectious disease outbreaks


Study of 33 year dataset of 12,102 outbreaks of 215 human infectious diseases:

- Total number and diversity of outbreaks, and richness of diseases have increased since 1980
- 65% of diseases were zoonoses
- Salmonellosis caused most outbreaks





# “Blurred lines of emergent disease and ecosystem health”

Primary drivers of disease emergence associated with the past emerging zoonotic disease events




Created based on data from Jones *et al.* (2013)<sup>5</sup>






# Summary: Process of pandemic emergence




Biodiversity, wildlife, and humans

- Deforestation and urban sprawl force wildlife into new habitats
- Higher population densities lead to increased number of interactions between humans and animals
- Global trade and travel ensure that insects, animals, and humans will interact in novel settings

# Climate change




# Climate change






# Biodiversity, globalisation and communicable disease in Europe



# Vector-borne disease



# Chikungunya in Europe, 2017



- 2 clusters of local Chikungunya transmission in August 2017
- 13 confirmed cases




# Chikungunya in Europe, 2017




- 239 confirmed and probable Chikungunya cases in Lazio
- 6 cases in Calabria

# Climatic suitability for *Aedes albopictus*






# Climate change and chikungunya in Europe



- Moderate expansion of climatic suitability across much of central Europe, notably in France and Italy
- Large areas surrounding the Rhine and Rhone rivers in Germany and France, respectively, are also projected to increase in suitability.
- Some parts of the region of highest current suitability in northern Italy are projected to experience a decline in suitability due to increased summer droughts, which will reduce the habitat suitability for the vectors.

# Tick-borne diseases





# Climate related disease risks in Europe

Strength of link with climate change in Europe	High		<i>Vibrio</i> spp. (except <i>V. cholerae</i> O1 and O139)* Visceral leishmaniasis*	Lyme borreliosis*	Weighted high risk		
	Medium	CCHF Hepatitis A Leptospirosis	Tularaemia Yellow fever Yersiniosis	<b>Campylobacteriosis</b> <b>Chikungunya fever*</b> Cryptosporidiosis Giardiasis Hantavirus	<b>Rift Valley fever</b> Salmonellosis Shigellosis VTEC West Nile fever	Dengue fever TBE*	Weighted medium risk
	Low	Anthrax Botulism Listeriosis Malaria	Q fever Tetanus Toxoplasmosis	Cholera (O1 and O139) Legionellosis Meningococcal infection			Weighted low risk
		Low	Medium	High			
		Potential severity of consequence to society					

Weighted risk analysis of climate change impacts on infectious disease risks in Europe. CCHF, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever. Candidates for suggested changes to disease-specific surveillance are in bold. Asterisks indicate diseases currently notifiable in some EU member states but not legally reportable to ECDC.

# Understand risks in greater detail

- **e.g. VectorNet**
- Network of medical and veterinarian entomologists and public and animal health professionals, working in the field of vectors or vector-borne diseases;
- To carry out targeted entomological surveillance
- To collect information on the geographical distribution of priority vectors for human and animal health:
- To deliver ad-hoc scientific advice to support ECDC and EFSA; => increase synergies




# Vector distribution maps in Europe and neighbouring countries




## *Aedes albopictus* and *Aedes aegypti* established/introduced/absent



*Aedes albopictus* - current known distribution: April 2017



*Aedes aegypti* - current known distribution: April 2017







# EUROPEAN ANTIBIOTIC AWARENESS DAY

A EUROPEAN HEALTH INITIATIVE

English (en) ▾

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## Communicating to professionals in hospitals and long-term care facilities

Up to half of all antibiotic use in hospitals is unnecessary or inappropriate. Antibiotic misuse in hospitals is a major driver of antibiotic resistance. What can be done?

[View materials](#) ▶

[New communication toolkit](#)

[Patient stories](#)

[Data and reports](#)



## #KeepAntibioticsWorking: join us on social media!

As a healthcare professional, **what can you do to keep antibiotics working?** What can a patient association do to contribute? What can policymakers do at European level? What can a parent do? Everyone can join the campaign on European Antibiotic Awareness Day—posting his/her own **message, picture or video** using the **#KeepAntibioticsWorking** hashtag. Tell the world what you do, in your professional or personal life, at individual or collective level, to use antibiotics responsibly and **#KeepAntibioticsWorking!**

[Read about the #KeepAntibioticsWorking campaign](#)

<https://antibiotic.ecdc.europa.eu>



# e.g. Collaboration between EU agencies on surveillance of AMR and AMC



EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY  
SCIENCE MEDICINES HEALTH



Surveillance of AMR and antimicrobial consumption in humans (EARS-Net, ESAC-Net, HAI-Net, FWD-Net)

Surveillance of antimicrobial consumption in animals (ESVAC)

Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in animals and foods

## Joint Interagency Antimicrobial Consumption and Resistance Analysis report (JIACRA)

First report published in January 2015  
Second report published in July 2017




# Joint Interagency Antimicrobial Consumption and Resistance Analysis (JIACRA): examples

## Poultry

Quinolone consumption and probability of resistance to quinolones in *Campylobacter jejuni* from poultry, EU/EEA, 2014


OR = 2.71 [1.57 – 5.63],  $p < 0.001$



## Humans

Carbapenem consumption and probability of resistance to carbapenems in invasive *Klebsiella pneumoniae* from humans, EU/EEA, 2015

OR = 1.23 [1.08 – 1.42],  $p = 0.002$



Each dot represents one country.


# Environment outside of hospitals wards / hospitals

- 6 hospitals in Brooklyn, NY
- 15 ceftazidime-resistant *Acinetobacter baumannii* from **environmental surfaces within a 0.5 mile radius from the hospital** (vs none if >0.5 mile)
- Emergency room door, clinic door, restaurant door, bakery door, diner door, pizza parlor door, donut shop door, deli door, grocery door, internet cafe bathroom, internet cafe door, subway door, subway hand railing, ...



# Public transportation (busses, metro)


- **Porto (Portugal)**
  - 36% of 199 buses with MRSA
  - 2 of 3 major clones are the same as in hospitals
  - Association between proportion of MRSA contamination and bus serving more than 3 hospitals
- **Midwestern U.S. (urban)**
  - 63% of 40 buses with MRSA
- **New York Subway**
  - *Acinetobacter baumannii* at 220/466 stations sampled





# Mobile communication devices


- **Review of literature**
  - 9-25% mobile communication devices with pathogenic bacteria
  - 0-10% with MRSA
- **UK**
  - 16% of 390 mobile phones in 12 cities contaminated with *E. coli* (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Queen Mary, University of London)




# International travel

Date	Departure	Destination
Today	14:10	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	14:35	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	14:40	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	14:45	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	14:55	Baxjö
Today	15:00	Holmen
Today	15:00	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	15:00	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	15:05	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	15:05	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	15:10	Wasserdam
Today	15:15	<b>MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT MICROORGANISMS</b>
Today	15:15	Mørup

# Frequency of fecal carriage of multidrug-resistant *Enterobacteriaceae* in international travellers, February 2012-April 2013



Source: Ruppé E, et al. Clin Infect Dis 2015 Apr 22. pii: civ333  
Ruppé E, et al. Eurosurveillance 2014 Apr 10;19(14). pii: 20768.




## Food-borne diseases





# EU key collaborators for foodborne diseases



Administrative boundaries: ©EuroGeographics ©UN-FAO ©Turkstat ©GADM


\*RASFF = Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed

\*\*EURL for VTEC=European Union Reference Laboratory for verotoxigenic *E. coli*

# Trends in priority foodborne diseases, 2015




## Salmonellosis




Source: Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Romania did not report data to the level of detail required for the analysis.

## Listeriosis




Source: Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Portugal did not report data to the level of detail required for the analysis.

## ShigaToxin-producing *E. coli* (STEC)




Source: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Portugal, Romania and Spain did not report data to the level of detail required for the analysis.

## Campylobacteriosis



Source: Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Portugal and Romania did not report data to the level of detail required for the analysis. In Greece, campylobacteriosis is not under surveillance.

# S. Enteritidis multicountry outbreak cases by week of statistics\* and case classification (n=584), EU/EEA 2015-2017, as of 05/05/2017



\*Week of onset, or week of sampling or week of received date at reference lab level

# Multi-country outbreak




- RASFF: countries encouraged to perform MLVA on official non-human poultry product samples positive for *S. Enteritidis* since May 2016
- UK and NL: perform food chain distribution analysis on food outlets associated with cluster of confirmed cases
  - => Identification of common origin of eggs from a large egg packing station in another country
- NL sampled 5000 eggs from the packing centre and identified positive eggs
- EU-wide trace-back and forward initiated





# Improved signal detection and response to multi-country foodborne outbreaks

MLVA<sup>1</sup> + PFGE<sup>2</sup>



Weekly cluster reports

MLVA	Pathogens	Countries	Size and proportion	Method	Pattern
<b>Clusters of rare/new genotype<sup>1/2</sup></b>					
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	AT, NL	4	PFGE	A60:0283_A60:0290
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, NL, NO	8	MLVA	EVT-3-9-9-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, NL, NO, UK	10	MLVA	EVT-3-10-9-2
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, NO, UK	4	MLVA	EVT-3-10-6-4-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, LU	2	MLVA	EVT-3-10-6-0-2
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, NO, UK	13	MLVA	EVT-3-10-6-3-2
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, UK	2	MLVA	EVT-3-10-7-2-2
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, NO	4	MLVA	EVT-3-10-4-1-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	NO, UK	2	MLVA	EVT-3-10-7-2
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, UK	3	MLVA	EVT-3-12-4-1-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	NO, UK	2	MLVA	EVT-3-12-1-1-1
<b>Clusters of common genotype<sup>1/2</sup></b>					
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, SE, NL, SE	19	MLVA	TYP-3-14-9-10-211
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, NL, NO, UK	131	MLVA	EVT-3-10-9-4-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, LU, NL, NO, UK	321	MLVA	EVT-3-10-9-4-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, LU, NL, NO, UK	125	MLVA	EVT-3-8-9-1
000212	Salmonella Enteritidis	DK, LU, NL, NO, UK	18	MLVA	EVT-3-11-7-3-2
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, LU, NL, SE	17	MLVA	TYP-3-14-10-10-211
<b>Small clusters of common genotype<sup>1/2</sup></b>					
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	NL, SE, UK	4	MLVA	TYP-3-13-10-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	NL, NO, SE, UK	8	MLVA	TYP-3-12-12-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, NL, SE	4	MLVA	TYP-3-14-10-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	NL, SE	1	MLVA	TYP-3-14-9-10-211
<b>Endemic clusters<sup>1/2</sup></b>					
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, FI, FR, SE, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK	702	MLVA	TYP-3-13-9-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, FI, SE, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK	1070	MLVA	TYP-3-13-9-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, FI, SE, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK	993	MLVA	TYP-3-13-9-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, FI, SE, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK	524	MLVA	TYP-3-12-12-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, FI, SE, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK	233	MLVA	TYP-3-12-12-10-211
000212	Salmonella Typhimurium	DK, FI, SE, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK	41	MLVA	TYP-3-13-10-10-211

ECDC Extranet | EPIS FWD

Urgent Inquiry: unusual increase of cases at national level

Whole genome sequencing (WGS) support since 2015

Joint ECDC-EFSA Rapid Outbreak Assessments

**Multi-country outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis phage type 8, MLVA type 2-9-7-3-2 and 2-9-6-3-2 infections**  
27 October 2016

**Conclusions and options for response**

A multi-country outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis phage type 8 (PT 8) with multiple toxin co-conjugates (Salmonella enteritidis phage type 8-2-9-7-3-2 and 2-9-6-3-2) has been identified in the ECDC/EFSA. Based on a joint ECDC-EFSA investigation, the outbreak is linked to a number of food establishments and at least a retail chain in Denmark originating from packaging center B in Finland. Additionally, the cases in the Czech Republic had consumed eggs originating from packaging center B in Finland. Additional samples of eggs intended for direct human consumption originating from the implicated Public packaging center B were performed in the Netherlands in October 2016 and confirmed results for 4 indistinguishable, highly case-specific 8 Enteritidis isolates from the above-mentioned cases were found to have MLVA type 2-9-7-3-2 and to belong to the two MLVA clusters associated with this outbreak. A further 16 isolates from food facilities in Hungary, sampled in May and November 2016 and identified through a company's own check routine, were also demonstrated to be part of one of the two MLVA clusters defining the outbreak. The isolates originated from unspiced (before processing) fried eggs which were made from fresh eggs imported to Hungary from the Public packaging center B.

The available evidence from WGS, food and environmental investigations, as well as from tracking back investigations of eggs, establishes a link between the indistinguishable foodborne outbreak and the packaging center B in Finland, pointing at eggs as the most likely vehicle of infection for at least part of the outbreak cases. Additional information from epidemiological, food and WGS investigations might bring further evidence on the possible vehicles and sources of infection associated with this outbreak. The molecular typing of isolates defining

Supplemental information: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and European Food Safety Authority. **Investigation of a multi-country outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis phage type 8 (MLVA type 2-9-7-3-2 and 2-9-6-3-2) infections**, 27 October 2016. EFSA Journal 2016


© European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, European Food Safety Authority, Stockholm, 2016

<sup>1</sup>MLVA=Multi-Locus Variable number tandem repeat Analysis

<sup>2</sup>PFGE=Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis

# Trace-back investigation at EU level

**Figure 5. Graphical representation of traceability and testing information available in RASFF or provided by Member States to EFSA, as of 1 March 2017**



# Common themes



**Vector-  
borne  
disease**



**AMR**



**Food-borne  
disease**

# Common themes



## Risk drivers


- Environmental and ecological factors
- Globalisation in trade and travel

## Integrated analyses growing in importance

- Identifying, analysing and responding to communicable diseases requires multi-agency and multi-disciplinary collaboration
- 'One Health' needs to be operationalised

## Cross-border action also growing in importance


- Disease risks and outbreaks cross borders and so must public health action (e.g. Decision 1082/2013/EU)






# Benefits of cross-sectoral action

Illustrative Relationship between Time of Detection of Emerging Zoonotic Disease and Total Cost of Outbreak




# Earlier detection of risks

Early detection and control efforts reduce disease incidence in people and animals



Source: Karesh *et al.* (2012)<sup>25</sup>

# Effective public health response



# Thank you!

[jonathan.suk@ecdc.europa.eu](mailto:jonathan.suk@ecdc.europa.eu)

